Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 38, Issue 1

2015

Article 18

Justice Among the Ashes: How Government
Compensation Facilities Can Bring Justice to
Disaster Victims
Lindy Rouillard-Labbé∗
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INTRODUCTION
How should governments provide financial assistance to disaster
victims in order to maximize their satisfaction? What are the key
factors that influence whether victims think the facility created to
process and resolve their claims for disaster compensation is fair?
Of course, a priority when a disaster occurs is to get the victims
back on their feet.1 States are increasingly called upon to provide
financial assistance to those affected by natural hazards. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) has provided nearly
US$10.5 billion to Hurricane Katrina victims.2 After the 1993 great
floods in the American Midwest, the US Congress reimbursed more
than US$6 billion for property damage.3 A few hundred miles north,
1. The term disaster (or catastrophe) generally designates an event or situation that has a
very low probability of materializing and that, if it occurs, will generate great and sudden
harm, thereby overwhelming local capacities and necessitating external assistance. See
VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS – A COMPARATIVE LAW
AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 6 (2010); Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating
the Intersection of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783, 1787-88
(2011).
2. See Louisiana Hurricane Katrina (DR-1603), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
(June 17, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/disaster/1603?page=3%2C0%2C4#tabs-1 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014). This total includes dollars approved under Individual Assistance, Individual and
Households Program, Housing Assistance, and Other Needs Assistance.
3. Charles Theiling, Ecological Status and Trends of Upper Mississippi System 1998, at
15-5 (1998).
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in Canada, more than CAN$700 million was distributed after the
1998 devastating ice storm in eastern Ontario and southern Quebec.4
Even in the context of man-made disasters, there have been instances
where governments have stepped in and provided compensation to
victims and victims’ survivors. The most frequently cited example is
the Victim Compensation Fund (“VCF”) created by Congress days
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
In establishing claim resolution facilities5 for disaster victims,
governments face numerous daunting questions: what should the
eligibility criteria be; what level of evidence should the facilities
require; should there be a cap placed on compensation; should
claimants have a right to a hearing or a right to appeal; etc.6 The
answers given to these questions are crucial, as they will affect the
perceived fairness of damage awards—by political leaders, the
general population, and the affected beneficiaries—and this
acceptance is an essential component of the facilities’ legitimacy.7
Surprisingly, despite the substantial amount of money
governments recurrently invest in disaster compensation facilities and
despite the importance of the beneficiaries’ opinion for the facilities’
legitimacy, there is little empirical evidence of what the beneficiaries
think of these facilities.8 The vast literature on perceived procedural
and distributive justice has only sparsely penetrated the area of claims
processing facilities for disaster victims. The little we know comes
4. Canadian Disaster Database, PUB. SAFETY CAN., http://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/
srchpg-eng.aspx?dynamic=false (last visited January 2, 2014)(Select “New Brunswick”,
“Ontario”, and “Québec” in “Location”; select “Winter Storm” in “Event Type”; enter “1998”
to “1998” in “Time Period”; then follow “Search” hyperlink).
5. McGovern defines “claims resolution facilities” as “a generic term used to describe a
wide range of entities that process and resolve claims made against a potential funding
source.” Francis E. McGovern, The What and the Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (2005). I will use the terms “claims resolution facilities” or “claims
processing facilities” and “government compensation programs” interchangeably.
6. See generally Robert R. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics
Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 964-78 (discussing the critical
issues to be addressed in the design of an administrative compensation scheme).
7. See generally Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 131 (2009) (noting the value of studying
stakeholders’ interests for the legitimacy, credibility and good functioning of a dispute
system); McGovern, supra note 5, at 1378 (discussing strategies to achieve legitimacy in
claims resolution facilities).
8. Cf. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL (2012) (discussing design strategies for disaster
compensation facilities); McGovern, supra note 5, at 1375-79 (discussing design strategies to
achieve legitimacy in claims resolution facilities).
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from research studying specific aspects of claimants’ experience with
the 9/11 VCF, a fund that was both unprecedented and unlikely to be
replicated in the future. These studies show that claimants were
dissatisfied with the VCF, that they evaluated their experience not
only in terms of monetary, but also non-monetary goals, and that they
expected a compensation award based on tort distributive principles—
that is, full compensation.9
In this Paper, I present the results of a survey aiming to puzzle
together these pieces of information in order to fully understand what
makes disaster victims think a government compensation program is
fair or not. The research focuses on the compensation facilities for the
victims of the historic floods that swept across Manitoba, Canada, in
Spring 2011. I chose to study these compensation facilities because
they present a more modest compensation facility, whose model is
more likely to be replicated in the future, and involve a different,
perhaps more recurring context—that of “natural” disasters.
Part I sets out the general background about the floods. This
disaster was selected because it was unprecedented in terms of scope,
magnitude, duration, and costs of recovery. Additionally, because of
the potential natural explanation for the event, this case allows for
drawing interesting parallels with studies about man-made disasters
such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
In Part II, I review areas of literature on which this research
builds. The psychology as well as law and society literatures provide
a context for identifying the reasons why individuals tend to judge
disasters as “not natural.” These literatures also illustrate the
consequences of this perception in terms of expectation of redress and
justice. After explaining the multi-dimensional concept of justice, I
discuss prior empirical research on facility claimants’ perceptions of
justice and identify the need for more empirical research.
In Part III, I briefly describe the methodology behind the study. I
conducted nine preliminary interviews and surveyed residents of two
Manitoban communities hit by the floods. Results were also validated
in a third Manitoban community also affected by the floods.
9. See Brian H. Bornstein & Susan Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive
Justice in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75,
90–91 (2007); Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 660-73
(2008); Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for
Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 444-48 (2003).
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In Part IV, I present the survey results. I found that the perceived
severity and persistence of material damage, as well as attribution of
cause to natural forces, influence victims’ perception of justice of the
disaster compensation programs, while other variables such as the
amount of compensation did not. This finding partly contradicts and
partly confirms previous research on the 9/11 VCF.
In Part V and the Conclusion, I discuss the implications of the
Study in more detail. Essentially this Paper aims at building the
empirical foundation for the pending policy debate on how best to
compensate victims of disasters. The results offer strong support to
those calling for process pluralism, where the facility offers a variety
of claims resolution techniques to disaster victims, and for retaining
the tort system above the limits of the government compensation
programs. Future disasters, natural or man-made, will unfortunately
occur in Canada, in the United States, and elsewhere. We therefore
need to consider what approach should be taken to compensate
individuals that suffer losses and what policies are needed to further
that approach.
I. BACKGROUND
A. 2011 Floods in Manitoba
Many Manitobans remember the year 2011 as one of tragedy and
despair. They were used to seeing the flow of water increase in late
winters and early springs because of high precipitation and melting
snow. In 2011, however, numerous Manitoban rivers and creeks
reached historic levels, some spilling over their banks, flooding fields
and cities.
The Assiniboine River is one of the major river systems of the
province, carrying water from Saskatchewan and North Dakota. In
order to reduce the river’s flows and prevent flooding along its shore,
the Manitoban government opened the Portage Diversion, a water
control structure constructed in 1971 to divert water from the
Assiniboine River into Lake Manitoba. The government’s handling of
the Portage Diversion was later criticized, and many argued that it
caused or aggravated the flooding around Lake Manitoba, thus
resulting in “artificial floods.”10 Without getting into the details of
10. See, e.g., JON GERRARD, FINAL REPORT - FLOOD OF 2011: THE FLOOD WHICH
SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN AS SEVERE AS IT WAS 46 (2012), available at
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this debate,11 suffice it to say that, with the inflows from the Portage
Diversion and the Waterhen River, Lake Manitoba’s water level rose,
and it ultimately flooded many lakeshore communities. To make
matters worse, in May 2011, powerful winds whipped across the
swollen lake, creating large waves that pounded the shore and washed
inland. It took months for the Lake Manitoba water to return to its
nest.
In the midst of the crisis, Canadian military troops were
deployed in different areas of the province to help with the flood.
Many people, both paid employees and volunteers, spent long hours
assisting with emergency measures. At the peak of the floods, over
7000 people from more than 150 communities were forced to
evacuate their homes.12 The agricultural community was forced to
relocate tens of thousands of animals to safe lands. Many properties
were heavily damaged. Victims included homeowners, cottage
owners, business owners, ranchers, and farmers. A majority lived in
rural municipalities, but city residents were also affected. In

http://jongerrardmla.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Final-2011-Flood-Report-by-Dr-JonGerrard.pdf (“In essence, Lake Manitoba was used as a water storage reservoir to protect
people between Portage la Prairie and Winnipeg and in Winnipeg. That the Portage diversion
and Lake St. Martin were used effectively to reduce damage along the Assiniboine River and
in Winnipeg is undeniable.”).
11. This Paper does not intend to determine whether the government’s handling of the
water control structure caused or aggravated the floods. This analysis has been partially done
by the four different flood reviews commissioned by the government: the Flood Review Task
Force, Lake Manitoba and Lake St. Martin Regulation Review Committee, the Flood
Mitigation Study, and the Surface-water Management Strategy. See generally FLOOD REVIEW
TASK FORCE, MANITOBA 2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT (2013), available at
http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011flood/flood_review_task_force_report.pdf; LAKE
MANITOBA/LAKE ST. MARTIN REGULATION REVIEW, FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: A
REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION (2013), available at
http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011flood/regulation_review_report.pdf; ASSINIBOINE
RIVER AND LAKE MANITOBA BASINS FLOOD MITIGATION STUDY (2012), available at
http://gov.mb.ca/mit/floodinfo/floodproofing/reports/index.html; MANITOBA CONSERVATION
AND WATER STEWARDSHIP, MANITOBA’S SURFACE WATER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
available at http://gov.mb.ca/waterstewardship/questionnaires/surface_water_management/
pdf/surface_water_strategy_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
12. See Manitoba Floods (2011), CANADIAN RED CROSS, http://www.redcross.ca/
donate/your-donation-in-action/past-appeals/domestic/2011/manitoba-floods (last visited June
10, 2014); Harper Government Announces Additional Assistance to Manitoba for 2011 Spring
Flooding, PUB. SAFETY CAN. (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/
nws/nws-rlss/2012/20120703-eng.aspx.
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consequence, these floods have been the most costly in province
history: the recovery costs exceed CAN$1.2 billion.13
Although these numbers might seem low compared to some
recent US natural disasters, keeping in mind Canada’s vast territory
and low population density and the fact that the floods hit mostly rural
areas, the 2011 flooding was a major disaster for Manitoba. It
therefore called for extraordinary government assistance measures.
B. Government Disaster Assistance
As a consequence of the Canadian constitutional framework,
provinces are responsible for designing, developing, and delivering
disaster-related financial assistance.14 Since 1987, the province of
Manitoba has had a general disaster financial assistance (“DFA”)
program,15 which was expanded in the midst of the 2011 floods with
six special programs, each of which had its own purpose, eligibility
criteria, terms, and conditions.16 All three communities targeted by
this study fell into the geographic locations covered by the Lake
Manitoba Financial Assistance Program (“Lake Manitoba FAP”).
The Lake Manitoba FAP first assisted agricultural crop and
livestock producers with transportation of livestock, flood mitigation
measures, feed requirements, damage to agricultural infrastructure,
etc. The Program also reimbursed small businesses for their property
damage and loss of income due to flooding.
Most relevant to this research, however, the Program
compensated residents for damages incurred as a direct result of the
high water level.17 The Program reimbursed individual claimants
for:18
13. US$1.228 billion. See MANITOBA 2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 11, at 2.
14. However, since 1970, through agreements between the federal and provincial
governments, the federal government has provided financial assistance to provincial
governments when the cost of dealing with a disaster would place an undue burden on the
provincial economy. See PUB. SAFETY CAN., GUIDELINES FOR THE DISASTER FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE
ARRANGEMENTS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/dfaa/index-eng.aspx.
15. See Emergency Measures Act, R.S.M., c. E80 (Can. Man.).
16. See generally Flood 2011: Building and Recovery Action Plan, MAN. AGRIC. SERVS.
CORP., http://www.masc.mb.ca/masc.nsf/floodrecovery.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
17. I use the terms “compensation” and “assistance” interchangeably. Although the
various disaster assistance programs do not aim at fully compensating the losses, they provide
monetary awards in consideration of the damage suffered, which is sufficient in my view to
make them compensation programs. It is true, however, that some aspects of these programs—
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Emergency flood mitigation measures (up to CAN$10,000),19
Property damage20 (up to CAN$270,000 for a principal residence
and CAN$90,000 for a non-principal residence),21
Incremental living costs incurred as a result of forced temporary
relocation (as determined by the Program Administrator), and
Measures to reduce vulnerability to future flood damage, such as
house elevation (up to CAN$100,000 for principal residence and
CAN$40,000 for non-principal residence).22

Costs for which insurance coverage was available at reasonable
cost were excluded,23 as were intangible losses, medical expenses,
loss of income, and loss of market value. Interestingly, these
payments were not contingent on claimants waiving their rights under
the tort system. The Lake Manitoba FAP was therefore not developed

such as assistance for measures protecting residence from future flood damages—do not fall
within the realm of compensation, but they are not the focus of this research. See MANITOBA
2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 104.
18. See generally MAN. AGRIC. SERVS. CORP., LAKE MANITOBA FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, PART C – TERMS AND CONDITIONS para. 9 (2011), available at
http://www.masc.mb.ca/masc.nsf/terms_conditions_lake_manitoba_part_c-07.pdf.
19. See generally id. US$10,231. All amounts are converted based on the exchange rate
as of May 24, 2011, the day the Program was announced.
20. Id. Property damage includes costs to replace damaged infrastructure and inventory
or to repair them to their pre-damage condition, without deducting for depreciation.
21. Id. Respectively US$276,237 and US$92,079. If permanent protection against future
flood conditions is undertaken in a manner approved by the Program Administrator, the 10%
deductible is waived, bringing the ceiling to CAN$300,000—US$306,930—for principal
residences, and CAN$100,000—US$102,310—for temporary residences.
22. Id. This financial support is provided either under the Lake Manitoba FAP (up to
CAN$22,000—US$22,508) or under another program called the Individual Flood Protection
Initiative (“IFPI”) (up to CAN$100,000—US$102,310—for principal residence and
CAN$40,000—US$40,924—for non-principal residence). The amount received under the
Lake Manitoba FAP reduced on a dollar for dollar basis the amount received under the IFPI
program. Homeowners must contribute 14% of the costs.
23. In Canada, private home insurance typically excludes flood losses from coverage.
See SWISS RE & INSTITUTE FOR CATASTROPHIC LOSS REDUCTION, MAKING FLOOD
INSURABLE
FOR
CANADIAN
HOMEOWNERS
37–38
(2010),
available
at
www.iclr.org/images/Making_Flood_Insurable_for_Canada.pdf. However, public insurance
provided to Canadian farmers—through a program called Agri-recovery—played a major role
in insurance compensation for victims of the floods. In March 2012, more than CAN$111.5
million—US$114 million—had been paid under the Manitoba Agri-recovery program to
farmers affected by the floods. See GOV’T OF MAN., 2011 FLOOD COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
(Mar. 31, 2012), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011/flood/financial/
flood_compensation_programs_033112.pdf. Compensation to farmers is not, however, the
focus of this study.

2015]

JUSTICE AMONG THE ASHES

253

as an alternative to the tort system, but rather as a complement when
it was assumed that the tort system had no role to play.24
In order to receive compensation, residents had to file an
application form on or before November 30, 2011, accompanied by
sufficient evidence and documentation to verify the amount of losses
incurred. In total, 5573 individuals and small businesses filed a claim
with the Lake Manitoba FAP, and CAN$48,315,214 had been
distributed as of September 30, 2012.25 The Program Administrator
determined the amounts of compensation based on the evidence,
documentation claimants submitted, and an on-site inspection. The
terms and conditions did not provide claimants with a right to a
hearing, nor did they specify any deadline for the Program
Administrator to render its decision. If claimants were not satisfied
with the award, they could appeal it to the Building and Recovery
Action Plan Appeals Commission. The Commission held non-public
hearings where parties could present new evidence and make
representations. As of September 2012, 223 awards had been
appealed to the Appeals Commission.26
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
The purpose of this Research Study is to explain disaster
victims’ perceptions of justice towards government compensation
programs. In Part II.A, I will review the psychology as well as law
and society literatures, which provide a context for identifying the
reasons why individuals tend to look for human agency in explaining
a disaster and why they tend to expect justice and redress. In Part II.B,
24
However, Lake Manitoba flood victims have launched a CAN$260 million—US$266
million—class-action lawsuit against the Manitoba government for what they claim was the
deliberate flooding of the lake during the 2011 floods. In addition, First Nation members have
already filed two class-actions, in which they allege that governments and government entities
were negligent in failing to properly design and operate water control structures, and in failing
to provide appropriate warning of potential flooding. These three lawsuits are still ongoing.
See Statement of Claim, Pisclevich v. Manitoba, [2013] No. CI 13-01-82597 (Can. Que.);
Statement of Claim, Anderson v. Manitoba, [2012] No. CI 12-01-77146 (Can. Que.); First
FREE
PRESS,
http://
Nations
Sue
Province
Over
Flooding,
WINNIPEG
www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/first-nations-sue--province-over-flooding-130336763.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
25. US$49,431,295. These numbers exclude claims by agricultural crop and livestock
producers as well as claims for permanent flood mitigation measures under the Individual
Flood Protection Initiative. See MANITOBA 2011 FLOOD REVIEW TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 11, at 107-08.
26. See id.
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I will discuss the various dimensions of justice and identify gaps in
our empirical knowledge about justice perceptions in the context of
compensation after disaster.
A. Natural or Man-Made Disaster
Psychologists developed the attribution theory to describe the
processes by which individuals understand the cause of an event, the
factors that influence those processes, and the consequences of
different attributions.27 Although harmful events can often be seen as
the result of multiple concurrent forces, psychologists have suggested
that individuals tend to focus on one condition as “the” cause.28 This
condition can be internal to the self (e.g., the individual’s personality
traits or motivation) or external (e.g., other people or impersonal
forces).29 Causal attribution involves a judgment about the
antecedent(s) of an event. Unlike responsibility attribution, however,
it does not involve a judgment about whether people’s behavior
conformed to the legal and moral standards of appropriate behavior.30
There can be something counterintuitive in talking about
attribution to something other than impersonal forces in the context of
flooding—an event we often label as a “natural” disaster. In common
language, we refer to some disasters as “natural” and others as “manmade,” thereby suggesting that it is possible to classify disasters
27. Yoshitaka Kumagai et al., Why Are Natural Disasters Not “Natural” for Victims?,
26 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 106, 110 (2006); see also FRITZ HEIDER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 296 (1958); Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis,
From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 222-37 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1965); Harold H.
Kelley, Attribution Theory in Social Psychology, 15 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 192 (1967)
(developing the attribution theory to describe the processes through which individuals try to
master the causal structure of their environment).
28. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 146-47 (1991).
29. Kumagai et al., supra note 27, at 110; see also KELLY G. SHAVER, THE
ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 138
(1985); Joel T. Johnson & Jerome Drobny, Proximity Biases in the Attribution of Civil
Liability, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 283, 288 (1985).
30. Kumagai et al., supra note 27, at 110; see also SHAVER, supra note 29, at 87; Dan
Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 655 (1980); Frank D. Fincham & Joseph M. Jaspars, Attribution of Responsibility: From
Man the Scientist to Man as Lawyer, 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 81,
104-06 (1980); Kathleen M. McGraw, Subjective Probabilities and Moral Judgments, 21 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 509-10 (1985); Barry R. Schlenker et al., The Triangle
Model of Responsibility, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 632, 634 (1994).
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according to the force inducing them. Floods, earthquakes, wild fires,
and hurricanes are usually seen as natural disasters, while acts of
terrorism or industrial accidents are commonly understood as manmade (or technological) disasters. Yet scholars have debated for years
whether and where this distinction between natural and man-made
disasters should be drawn.31
Some argue that disasters must be defined according to their
social consequences, not upon their characteristics or causal factors.32
Under this approach, there would be no such thing as a natural or
man-made disaster. Other scholars attribute high significance to the
characteristics of the disaster—its origin and time, power,
destructiveness, predictability, potential for future occurrence, etc.
But there is no consensus as to where the line between natural and
man-made disaster stands—or even whether such line should be
drawn.33 Some have suggested drawing the distinction between
natural disasters and man-made disasters in terms of degree.34 Natural
disasters could therefore be conceived as those events that, on the
spectrum of disasters, are located closer to the “nature-induced” end
than to the “human-induced” one, but still generally bear attributes of
both.
These approaches all assume the objective reality of the
phenomenon of natural or man-made disasters. However, this
objective reality might not always be in line with people’s subjective
interpretation of the etiology of disasters, which is the focus of this
31. See generally J. Stephen Kroll-Smith & Stephen R. Couch, What is a Disaster? An
Ecological-Symbolic Approach to Resolving the Definitional Debate, 9 INT’L J. MASS
EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 355, 356-60 (1991); Jean T. Blocker & Darren E. Sherkat, In the
Eyes of the Beholder: Technological and Naturalistic Interpretations of a Disaster, 6 INDUS.
CRISIS Q. 153, 155-56 (1992) (summarizing and critiquing the two main approaches to the
study of disasters).
32. See, e.g., Enrico L. Quarantelli, What is Disaster? The Need for Clarification in
Definition and Conceptualization in Research, in DISASTERS AND MENTAL HEALTH:
SELECTED CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 41 (Barbara J. Sowder ed., 1985). Kroll-Smith and
Couch refer to this approach as the generic perspective of disasters. See Kroll-Smith & Couch,
supra note 31, at 356-59.
33. For example, experts do not agree on the characterization of airplane crashes as
natural or man-made disasters. Compare Charles B. Perrow, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING
WITH HIGH RISK TECHNOLOGIES, 123-69 (1999), with Michael Berren et al., A Typology for
the Classification of Disasters, 16 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 103, 106-07 (1980).
Kroll-Smith and Couch refer to this approach as the event-quality perspective of disasters. See
Kroll-Smith & Couch, supra note 31, at 359-60.
34. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total
Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251, 251 (2003).

256

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:245

Paper.35 Psychological research shows that victims of what we
commonly refer to as “natural” disasters tend to look for human
agency in explaining the event.36 For example, in a survey of victims
of a major urban flood, Blocker and Sherkat found that 65% of the
respondents assigned responsibility for the disaster to human agents
and technological failures, despite the unprecedented rainfall that
could have qualified this disaster as “natural.”37
Sociologists suggest that this tendency to blame man over nature
is the result of the transformation of our disaster ideology. In
primitive cultures, disasters were attributed to divinely ordained
patterns of relationships. In more modern worldviews, and until about
one hundred years ago, natural causes replaced divine actions. Natural
disasters were seen as the inevitable result of automatic processes of
nature. However, in Western countries today, people believe that
society has the technological capacity to control natural forces and
that government entities should protect the public from most natural
disasters. When these expectations are not met, people engage in a
blame attribution process.38
This change in disaster ideology echoes the transformation of
legal culture described by law and society scholars. They have argued
that collective perceptions of accidents transformed from acceptance
of the unfortunate and inexplicable to a general expectation of justice
and recompense for injuries and loss.39 Lawrence Friedman explains
this change in the legal culture as a cycle of demand and response.
Advances in science and technology increased the possibility of
control over nature, and people came to feel that it was possible to
control situations of peril. As a result, people demanded a more active
35. The subjectivity of disaster is recognized by Kroll-Smith and Couch in the
ecological-symbolic approach to disaster they proposed as an alternative to the two traditional
approaches to the study of disasters. See Kroll-Smith & Couch, supra note 31, at 361-65.
36. See, e.g., Kumagai et al., supra note 27 (suggesting a conceptual framework, based
on psychology research, to understand attribution behavior in natural disaster); see also A.
DeMan et al., Assignment of Responsibility and Flood Hazard in Catahoula County,
Louisiana, 17 ENV’T & BEHAV. 371, 371-72 (1985). See generally SHAVER, supra note 29, at
132-36 (discussing how the need to believe in a just world and to protect themselves influence
ascriptions of responsibility to others).
37. Blocker & Sherkat, supra note 31, at 153.
38. See generally id. at 164 (discussing the evolution of disaster ideology). See MARY
DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF
TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS, 30 (1982) (suggesting that current perceptions
of disasters have come full circle from those present in primitive cultures).
39. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 5 (1994).
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role of the government in exercising this control. Response from the
government led to greater expectations and changed people’s idea
about what was possible, natural, and feasible. This, in turn, led to
new demands for government interventions. The end result is a legal
culture where people expect fairness in every setting of their life and
redress for any calamity that happens. This is what Friedman calls
“Total Justice.”40
One objective of this Paper is to test one branch of the Total
Justice cycle: how unmet expectations for control of disasters
influence demands for redress. Or, in other words, whether
attribution—to those who maybe could have done something to
control the disaster—impacts victims’ sense of fairness in the
compensation process.
To my knowledge, this question has not been empirically
addressed before. If some attribution studies inquired about the
consequences of victims’ attribution—on activism for example41—
they did not measure the consequences on perceptions of justice. And
yet, there are some suggestions, derived from studies on non-victims’
perceptions of justice, that attribution for disaster losses may be
linked with justice judgments.42 In this Paper, I show that this
correlation also holds true for disaster victims themselves.
B. Perception of Justice
A law’s ideal perceived justness is not always achieved in
practice. In the context of claims processing facilities, some
commentators have expressed doubt as to whether claimants obtain
40. These psychological and cultural explanations of attributive behavior do not mean
that people’s causal judgments are always incorrect or incomplete. Despite the fact that the
causal picture of natural disasters is often complex, human agency can sometimes be
identified, scientifically or legally, as causative of disasters.
41. See E. Burke Rochford & Jean T. Blocker, Coping with Natural Hazards as
Stressors: The Predictors of Activism in a Flood Disaster, 23 ENV’T & BEHAV. 171, 185
(1991) (showing that victims’ interpretation of a disaster as controllable is directly related to
activism).
42. See, e.g., Udo Rudolph et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Help Giving and
Aggression from an Attributional Perspective: Contributions to a General Theory of
Motivation, 18 COGNITION & EMOTION 815, 817-19 (2004) (discussing studies showing that
non-victims’ attribution judgments determine their helping behavior towards victims); see also
MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 11-16 (2013) (arguing that public support for government
relief has historically been driven by a narrative of blameless victims, or, in other words, that
attribution of responsibility to victims may reduce public support for disaster relief).
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fairness. For example, Deborah Greenspan and Matthew Neuburger
wrote that “[a] system designed to settle claims in the most efficient
manner may actually be the opposite of what claimants want.”43 This
research tests this statement by asking what makes government
compensation programs just according to claimants.
Justice is a multi-dimensional concept.44 The following Section
describes the three core justice dimensions—namely, retributive
justice, procedural justice, and distributive justice.45
1. Retributive Justice
Retribution is arguably the most basic and most pervasive justice
reaction associated with human social life.46 It refers to a desire to
punish the violator of a rule, norm, or law. Retribution is a way for
victims to “get even” with the one who has wronged them.47 In that
sense, retribution is very close to the concept of corrective justice—
one theory of civil compensation. The two concepts have been
distinguished on the basis that retribution is more concerned with the
subjective psychological reaction of the victim, while corrective
43. Deborah E. Greenspan & Matthew A. Neuburger, Settle or Sue? The Use and
Structure of Alternative Compensation Programs in the Mass Claims Context, 17 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 97, 119 (2012); Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror
Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 689-91 (2003) (criticizing the 9/11 VCF);
Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Relief Excludes
Those Most in Need?, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 58 (2006) (noting that FEMA’s relief and
assistance proved ineffective for the most vulnerable and marginalized victims of Katrina);
Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm:
Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 358
(2003) (questioning whether the 9/11 VCF created distributive and procedural justice for
claimants). But cf. Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of
Damage Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 379 (2009) (comparing the successes of nofault schemes and those of the tort system for compensating disaster victims).
44. See generally John P. Goldberg, Doing Justice in the Face of Disaster, 45 AKRON L.
REV. 583 (2012) (discussing the various dimensions of justice in the context of disaster).
45. Some scholars distinguish between procedural justice and interactional justice: the
former being the fairness of formal procedures and the latter the fairness of the social process.
See, e.g., Robert J. Bies & John S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria of
Fairness, in RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 43, 45-46 (Roy J. Lewicki et al.
eds., 1986). However, Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind demonstrated that there is little difference
in reactions to procedural and interactional injustices, and therefore this Paper addresses them
together. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN LAW 65, n.2 (Joseph Sanders & Lee Hamilton eds., 2000).
46. Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
LAW, supra note 45, at 31.
47. Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Justice and Legal Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW, supra note 45, at 3, 6.
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justice focuses more on what is objectively needed to restore the
balance.48 Retribution seeks to restore the balance by punishing the
wrongdoer, and corrective justice does it by compensating the victim.
Still, these two concepts are closely related, and the pursuance of
corrective justice remedies is sometimes thought of as a civilized
transformation of the more basic instinct of retribution.49
2. Procedural Justice
Procedural justice refers to whether decisions are made in ways
that are fair. People’s reactions and acceptance of decisions of legal
authorities are driven by their assessment of the fairness of the
procedures through which these decisions were made. People are
more satisfied with the outcome when they feel that the procedures
were fair.50 Faced with inequality of power between them and a legal
authority, people use impressions of fairness as a heuristic to guide
their compliance or resistance.51
A growing body of legal scholarship is now interested in
describing non-monetary objectives of claimants and plaintiffs.52
There is now evidence that claimants and plaintiffs are motivated by a
desire for promoting accountability, gaining information, seeking
changes, and obtaining acknowledgement of their suffering. They do
not necessarily fit with the often-reported image of self-interested
rational actors whose conduct is driven by the desire to maximize
personal gain. For example, in a study about the victims of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, Hadfield demonstrated that some victims’ survivors
evaluated the tradeoff between a cash payment through the VCF and
the pursuit of litigation, not in terms of monetary compensation, but
rather in light of their interests for information, accountability, and
policy changes.53 Such objectives are often achieved through the
48. Id. at 6.
49. See generally id. at 6-7 (comparing retribution and corrective justice).
50. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 65.
51. See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 244 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 9, at 660-73; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief,
Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
457 (2003) (analyzing the VCF through the lens of grief and trauma experienced by the
claimants); Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims,
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 200-02 (1990) (discussing the considerations that affected
satisfaction of claimants to the New Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program).
53. Hadfield, supra note 9, at 660-73.
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procedures leading to an outcome, and not necessarily through the
outcome itself,54 hence the importance of procedural justice.
Research has identified a variety of factors influencing
perceptions of procedural fairness. Tyler and Lind classified them in
three categories: standing, trust, and neutrality.55 Standing—or status
recognition—refers essentially to the—perceived—opportunity that is
given to claimants to voice their side of the story. Trust emphasizes
claimants’ relational concerns, such as feeling that they are treated
politely, with dignity and respect, by the decision-maker. Finally,
neutrality relates to claimants’ perception of authorities’ legitimacy—
whether the authorities are honest and consistent, and whether they
guarantee unbiased treatment.
3. Distributive Justice
The concept of distributive justice refers to the fairness of the
distribution of—generally scarce—conditions and goods.56 There are
multiple distributive justice principles, and they include allocation on
the basis of need, equality, or equity—merit or contribution-based. A
need-based distribution allocates the resources in a manner that
maximizes the share of the poorest or most needy recipients. When
equity values underlie the distribution, the recipients’ merit, or
contribution—their efforts, sacrifice, ability, performance, etc.—
guide the allocation. Equal distribution—where everybody gets an
equal share of the resource—avoids the necessity of making
comparisons between potential recipients.
The conditions under which allocations are defined as just or fair
vary depending on the circumstances. For one thing, recipients’ and
allocators’ definition of fair distribution may be different. Also,
individuals’ preferences for—and assessment of—distributive
principles vary depending on the good being distributed, the context
of the distribution, the relationship of the parties, and individual
characteristics. Research shows that people prefer “equitable or
contributions-based rules in work situations where productivity is a
central concern, an equal division where group harmony is paramount
(such as in church groups), and a needs-based distribution rule in
54. Cf. Schneider, supra note 52, at 476-80 (comparing the process of the VCF with the
process of the tort system, in terms of meeting 9/11 victims’ survivors needs).
55. Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 75.
56. MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 31 (1985).
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contexts focusing on social welfare” or in intimate caring
relationships.57
Tort principles—under which resources are allocated by the
wrongdoer to a faultless plaintiff in order to make the latter
“whole”—do not exactly fit within these three values of distributive
justice. Wrongdoers are required to pay for plaintiffs’ loss of income,
medical expenses, and non-monetary losses. Parity and equal
treatment between plaintiffs is not really a concern for tort
distribution. The need principle plays a very modest role in tort
distribution. Although harms and injury may sometimes be a reliable
proxy for need, the tort system more realistically focuses on losses
rather than needs. In fact, because of the high value placed on
individualized calculation of loss, higher-earning victims can (and
generally will) receive greater awards than lower earners. In that
sense, equity principles mainly shape the calculation of tort awards.58
4. Emerging Issues and the Need for Empirical Research
In this Paper, I test justice theories in a novel context, that of
government compensation after disasters. Although a large body of
research now exists on procedural justice, it generally focuses on
perceptions of individual litigants involved in civil or criminal
disputes, or in alternative dispute resolution programs.59 Similarly,
applied research on distributive justice has emerged in the last two
decades to assess justice perceptions in a variety of institutional
settings—health care, income distribution in society, tax evasion,
etc.60 However, with the exception of the work on the 9/11 VCF,
these studies have not addressed the issue of justice judgments in the
context of government claims resolution facilities.
Three studies evaluating specific aspects of 9/11 victims’
experience with compensation provide useful insight for this Paper.
First of all, Bornstein and Poser studied VCF claimants’ perceptions
of procedural and distributive justice.61 They found that claimants
57. See Karen A. Hegvedt & Karen S. Cook, Distributive Justice: Recent Theoretical
Developments and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW, supra note 45,
at 93, 96.
58. See generally Hensler, supra note 9, at 425-26 (comparing the tort system’s approach
to other distribution principles).
59. See generally Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 71 (reviewing studies on procedural
justice).
60. See Hegvedt & Cook, supra note 57, at 123.
61. See generally Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9.
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were more satisfied with the procedural than distributive aspects of
the Fund and that perceptions of justice were correlated with the
claimant’s relationship to the victim—spouse, parents, others—and
the amount of compensation received from the Funds—although the
correlation was only marginally significant for procedural justice.
Justice judgments were not associated with gender or race.
Attributive judgments of 9/11 victims were assessed in a
separate study.62 Results of Hadfield’s online survey of 155 victims
show that respondents blamed not only the terrorists for the attacks—
on average attributing roughly a third the responsibility to terrorists.
Respondents also blamed those who bore responsibility for preventing
the terrorists from succeeding in their plan—US entities and officials,
airline security firms, etc.—as well as all those whose actions entered
the chain of events.
Finally, Hensler studied public comments made in reaction to the
VCF’s rules draft, with the goal of understanding how people felt
about compensation.63 She found that victims’ survivors were more
likely than other groups to use the language of equity, and they were
even more likely to argue for incorporating tort principles in the
VCF’s rules. The debate over the 9/11 VCF, she concluded, was
framed substantially by tort principles.
This Paper aims at puzzling together these pieces of information
to fully understand claimants’ perceptions of justice. I test distributive
and procedural justice perceptions, distributive preferences, and
attribution judgments, but my goal is to understand how these
variables influence each other to ultimately identify what factors
influence justice judgments.
The larger respondent population for the study reported in this
Paper—234 respondents compared to 71 in Bornstein and Poser’s
study and 155 in Hadfield’s study—may allow for deeper analysis of
the determinants of perceptions of justice. Unlike Hensler’s work, the
present Study’s inquiry takes place after victims experienced the
compensation programs. It therefore allows us to analyze what, in
their experience of the compensation programs, influenced their
views on distribution principles.
The context of this study is also slightly different than that of the
9/11 VCF. While both 9/11 and the Manitoba floods can be
62. See generally Hadfield, supra note 9.
63. Id.

2015]

JUSTICE AMONG THE ASHES

263

characterized as disasters, natural causes must be added to the
equation in the context of the 2011 spring floods. Also, the amount of
discretion granted to the VCF Special Master, the VCF’s method used
for calculating compensation—a modified tort-based approach,64 and
the almost limitless nature of the resources distributed by the VCF are
without parallel in the Manitoban government compensation
programs—and, in fact, in most government compensation programs.
This Study thus answers the need to investigate determinants of
justice judgments of claimants to claims processing facilities. It does
so in the context of a government disaster relief facility, whose
general model is likely to be replicated in the future for a disaster
where natural forces could be seen as—one of—the causes of the
losses.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Method
The purpose of this Paper is to identify what influences disaster
victims’ opinion of government compensation programs. I
investigated this question in three ways. First, I conducted
preliminary interviews with nine individuals who were either directly
affected by the flooding, involved in the recovery process, or involved
in one of the review committees. These interviews were used to build
a survey questionnaire for the second main phase of the study, in
which I surveyed residents of two Manitoban communities: Twin
Lakes Beach (“TLB”) and Lundar Beach & Sugar Point (“LB&SP”).
These two areas were selected because they represent a variety
of flooding experiences. TLB was said to be the hardest hit area, with
the highest density of population.65 Both LB&SP and TLB are mainly
composed of cottage owners and landowners. There are
approximately 115 households in LB&SP, and 300 in TLB.66 If one
uses election results as a proxy for political views, the political beliefs
64. See Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 738-53 (2003) (discussing the tort and social welfare roots of
the 9/11 VCF).
65. See Larry Kusch, Cottagers Clamour for Compensation, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS
(Mar.
31,
2012),
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/Cottagers-clamour-forcompensation-145419935.html?device=mobile.
66. This information was provided by the Twin Lakes Beach Association and the Lundar
Beach and Sugar Point Association.
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in the two communities appear to be roughly divided between
conservative and liberal views.67 These two areas are located near
Lake Manitoba and were flooded by water coming from the lake. The
above-described debate as to whether diversion of water by
government through the Portage Diversion caused the floods is very
alive in these communities.
Considering the size of the research population in these two
areas—approximately 415 households—no sample was drawn and all
residents were included in the study. Respondents were recruited via
an email—or a letter when no email address was available—that was
distributed by two local associations—the Twin Lakes Beach
Association and the Lundar Beach and Sugar Point Association—that
forwarded it to their members. These associations are not specifically
devoted to flood issues. Their mandate is generally to serve the
interests of residents in the area, promote good fellowship among
members, and promote good relations with surrounding communities.
People involved in the associations believed that their listservs were
fairly accurate, up-to-date, and included the vast majority of residents
in the area.
In February 2013, the survey was sent to 104 email addresses of
residents in LB&SP, and 321 email addresses and 25 regular mail
addresses of residents in TLB.68 In total, 450 surveys were sent. A
follow-up email was sent ten days after the initial invitation.
Responses were collected until March 2013. Respondents contacted
by email received a link to the questionnaire, administered via an
automated web-based survey system. Respondents contacted by
regular mail received a paper copy of the questionnaire with a selfaddressed stamped envelope. Responses were anonymous; however,
respondents could voluntarily provide their contact information.
67. A majority of voters in the electoral division including TLB and LB&SP voted for a
more conservative party (the Conservative Party—59.3% of votes) in the 2007 election, and
for a more liberal party (the New Democratic Party—50.2% of votes) in the 2011 election. See
MANITOBA
(2007),
Summary
of
Votes
Received,
ELECTIONS
http://www.electionsmanitoba.ca/downloads/PDF_EDResults_GE2007.pdf (last visited Nov.
19, 2014) (Select “Interlake / Entre-les-lacs”). See also Summary of Votes Received,
MANITOBA
(2011),
http://www.electionsmanitoba.ca/downloads/
ELECTIONS
PDF_EDResults_GE2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (Select “Interlake / Entre-les-lacs”).
However, people with summer homes in TLB and LB&SP might have voted in the electoral
division of their primary residence.
68. In TLB, because some households had registered more than one email address, the
number of households that received the survey is lower than the number of surveys sent. The
survey reached 308 households in TLB.

2015]

JUSTICE AMONG THE ASHES

265

Finally, in the third phase of the Study, results were validated in
a third community in April and May 2013. Similarly to the first two
communities, Delta Beach is located on the shore of Lake Manitoba
and is mainly composed of homeowners and cottage owners. Results
from past provincial elections indicate that the population of Delta
Beach is closely divided between conservative and liberal views.69
Delta Beach respondents were also recruited via an email
distributed by a local association. A link to the survey questionnaire
was also posted on the website of the association. The online
questionnaire was exactly the same as the one used in the first two
communities. Unlike the other two communities, however, it has not
been possible for the association to send a follow-up email.
B. Survey Respondents
In TLB and LB&SP, 196 respondents completed the
questionnaire,70 representing a response rate of 42%.71 This response
rate is relatively high compared to other web-based surveys72 and
similar studies on the 9/11 VCF.73 The targeted population was
successfully reached since all respondents indicated that they suffered
damage as a result of the 2011 floods,74 and 98% responded that this
damage occurred primarily in TLB or LB&SP. After removing the
four surveys from residents of communities other than TLB or
LB&SP, there were a total of 192 useable survey responses.

69. Residents of Delta Beach voted in Portage La Prairie. In 2011, the Conservative
Party obtained 52% of votes, the New Democratic Party 43.1%, and the Liberal Party 8.4%. In
2007, the Conservative Party obtained 48.1% of votes, the New Democratic Party 42.2%, and
the Liberal Party 9.3%. See Summary of Votes Received, ELECTIONS MANITOBA (2007), supra
note 67 at “Portage La Prairie / Portage-la-Prairie”; Summary of Votes Received, ELECTIONS
MANITOBA (2011), supra note 67 (Select “Portage La Prairie / Portage-la-Prairie”).
70. Because of the sensitivity of the question topics, participants were allowed to skip
questions. Therefore, partially completed surveys were included when 75% or more of the
questionnaire was completed.
71. The response rate was 40% (138) in TLB and 52% (54) in LB&SP. The response rate
is lower in TLB because of the low number of responses to the questionnaire sent by regular
mail (5 out of 25).
72. A response rate of 20% or less is not infrequent for web-based surveys. See Dorine
Andrews et al., Electronic Survey Methodology: A Case Study in Reaching Hard to Involve
Internet Users, 16 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 185, 191 (2003).
73. See Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9, at 87 (response rate of 25.5%); see also
Hadfield, supra note 9, at 651 (unknown response rate).
74. Three participants indicated they had not suffered any damage, but their
questionnaires were excluded because they were incomplete.

266

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:245

The Appendix displays demographic characteristics of the
respondent population. Most of the respondents were cottage owners
(77%), their most frequent household income was CAN$40,000 to
CAN$59,999 (19%), and there were, on average, 2.67 individuals per
household. However, as the research protocol was designed so that
one person per household—most likely the household head—
completed the survey, personal characteristics of respondents do not
align with characteristics of general population. Most of the
participants were male (59%). Respondents were between 28 and 100
years old, with a median age at 58.5.75 Their employment rate—
50%—was lower than population’s employment rate in TLB’s and
LB&SP’s rural municipality. A little less than half of the respondents
(43%) were retired.
In the validation community, thirty-eight respondents completed
the questionnaire. The total number of people to whom the survey
was sent is unknown and therefore, it is impossible to determine the
response rate. Because Delta Beach is said to consist of about 200
households,76 the response rate may be around 19%. As shown in the
Appendix, respondents in Delta Beach are comparable to those in the
first two communities.
Overall, the respondents were representative of the population of
the three target communities. Although self-selection bias is a
limitation of any survey research, my recruitment method appears to
have selected individuals with a broad range of opinions and
background, and not only those unsatisfied with compensation.
Indeed, responses show a variety of opinions with regards to the
procedural and distributive justice of the compensation programs.
Also, the respondent population evidences substantial representation
of both activists and non-activists.77
C. Materials
The content of the questionnaire was developed after reviewing
the relevant legislation and literature, and conducting preliminary
75. Statistic Canada 2012 census indicates that the median age of the population is fortysix years old in the rural municipality of Coldwell (to which LB&SP pertains) and 48.4 years
old in the rural municipality of St-Laurent (to which TLB pertains).
76. See DELTA BEACH, http://deltabeach.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2013).
77. See Appendix for details. No statistically significant differences were detected in the
responses of activists and non-activists.
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interviews. It also built on similar research studies done in the context
of the 9/11 VCF.78 It was pilot-tested on Master of Laws degree
students from Stanford Law School before being sent to participants.
The questionnaire consisted of fifty-five questions, with a few
open-ended, but mostly closed-ended questions. It included questions
regarding: 1) type of damage suffered, 2) claim filed with government
compensation programs, 3) perceived fairness of the process, 4)
perceived fairness of the outcome of government compensation
programs, 5) attribution of cause and responsibility, and 6)
demographic characteristics.
The survey was structured with a branching function, which
automatically directed respondents to the next question that is
relevant to their reported experience, based on a pre-defined scheme.
Respondents could skip a question or select the option “I don’t know”
when they did not recall the information. Respondents who skipped a
question or chose “I don’t know” were excluded from the analysis for
that particular section. Thus, although the total number of respondents
was 192 in the two main communities, the number of respondents
(“N”) is smaller for some questions.
IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS
In this Part, I will present selected background data on the
respondents in Part IV.A, and their perceptions of justice towards the
government compensation programs in Part IV.B. Overlapping these
two sets of data, I will then show which factors influence
respondents’ justice judgments in Part IV.C. Finally, in Part IV.D I
will briefly present the validation results.
A. Background Data on Respondents
1. Damage Suffered
Respondents were asked to indicate the type and severity of
damage their household suffered as a result of the floods. Most
respondents reported damage to property (98%), emotional and
psychological pain and suffering (98%), damage due to clean up
measures (96%), and damage related to temporary mitigation
78. See Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9, at 91-92. See generally Hadfield, supra note 9;
Hensler, supra note 9.
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measures (88%). As Figure 1 shows, these four categories of damage
were also the ones for which reported severity was the highest.
Seventy-four percent of respondents indicated that they are still
suffering from some kind of damage, the most frequent being damage
to property, emotional and psychological pain, and costs of clean up
measures.
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Figure 1 – Severity of Reported Damage by Type

2. Expectations Regarding Application with Government Program(s)
All but three respondents reported having filed an application for
compensation with one of the government compensation programs.79
Respondents’ expectations regarding their application were
numerous, and included both monetary and non-monetary objectives.
As Table 1 indicates, the most frequent expectation was monetary
compensation, but it was closely followed by a search for
accountability, changes, and prevention.

79. Ninety-three percent (170) of the respondents said they had filed an application with
the Lake Manitoba FAP, and 28% (51) with the Disaster Financial Assistance Program. Due to
the extreme complexity of the different programs, respondents’ reports of the program(s) with
which they filed an application may not always be accurate.
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% OF
RESPONSES

OBJECTIVES

12% (22)
Buy-out of property
I wanted the government to buy my property.
85% (156)
Monetary Compensation
I wanted to obtain money to compensate for
damage suffered.
72% (132)
NonChanges and Prevention
monetary I wanted to help change things and prevent this
from happening again.
63% (115)
Retribution
I wanted those who caused or contributed to the
damage(s) suffered to pay for what they did.
80% (147)
Accountability
I wanted those who caused or contributed to the
damage(s) suffered to be held accountable.
61% (114)
Acknowledgment
I wanted to obtain a decision acknowledging the
damage I suffered.
34% (63)
Be heard
I wanted a chance to have someone else hear what
happened to me.
4% (7)
Other
None
I did not have specific hope.
Table 1 – Respondents’ Objectives in Filing a Claim with a Government
Compensation Program (N = 184)
Monetary

3. Compensation
Participants were asked to indicate how much money they had
received as a result of their application by checking one of several
possible ranges. There was a broad range of compensation reported,
with a mode and a median between CAN$10,000 and CAN$49,999
(Table 2). Because the compensation programs were still underway at
the time of the survey, 49% of respondents indicated they were still
expecting to receive money as a result of their application(s), while
28% did not, and 22% replied they did not know.
RANGE*
Zero
$1 to $4,999

% OF RESPONDENTS
6% (11)
14% (26)
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% OF RESPONDENTS

$5,000 to $9,999
24% (43)
$10,000 to $49,999
32% (58)
$50,000 to $99,999
17% (31)
$100,000 to $199,999
6% (10)
$200,000 to $299,999
1% (2)
$300,000 or more
0% (0)
Table 2 – Amount of Money Received from Compensation Programs
(N=181)
* in Canadian dollars

4. Attribution
The survey investigated attribution of cause by asking
respondents to allocate 100 points among twelve factors, persons, and
organizations, presented in a randomized order.80 This list was
generated from the nine preliminary interviews. The requirement that
the total points allocated sum to 100 was enforced by the online
survey mechanism. Respondents were then given the opportunity to
rate how much they thought someone was at fault. Those who
indicated “somewhat” or “completely” were then asked to indicate
who they thought was most at fault. These three questions were
placed near the end of the survey, after questions on distributive and
procedural justice, to avoid the possibility that reflecting on
attribution and blame biased responses would lead respondents to be
more critical towards the compensation programs.
As Table 3 shows, over 75% of respondents thought the
government of Manitoba was the main cause of their losses. Only
4.4% of respondents did not attribute any points to the government of
Manitoba. On average, respondents distributed 73.62 points, out of
100, to the government of Manitoba.
Natural forces came next, with an average of 7.66 distributed
points. An average of 7.39 points were distributed to the answer
“some equipment,” which thirty-six respondents out of thirty-eight
indicated referred either to the Portage Diversion—controlling inflow
of water in Lake Manitoba, the Fairford Dam—controlling outflow of
water from Lake Manitoba, or the inadequate outlet to offset inflow of
water in Lake Manitoba. Because the government controlled these
80. The structure of this question was taken from the survey of Hadfield. Hadfield, supra
note 9, at 655-56.
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structures, these answers could be seen as additional attribution of
cause to the government.
As to attribution of responsibility, 87% of respondents thought
their losses were somewhat or completely the result of someone else’s
fault, and 95% of them identified the government of Manitoba as the
organization or person who was most at fault.
Respondents were given a chance to comment on their responses
about attribution. Most of the comments pointed to the diversion of
water into Lake Manitoba and the inadequate outlet of water from the
lake. Many respondents also referred to the strategic choices made by
the government. An example of such comment is: “Government chose
to sacrifice our beach to save other areas from flooding. They just
need to own up to their decision.” Interestingly, most of these
comments did not criticize the choice as the wrong one, but
highlighted the consequences this decision must have on justice
issues. For example, one respondent wrote:
[I]t was a choice between saving the City of Winnipeg tens of
billions of dollars or destroying all of Lake Manitoba’s
stakeholders investments. Most of the Lake Manitoba’s
stakeholders understand that . . . . What we do not understand is
why we are fed to the bureaucratic dogs when trying to return
and rebuild our homes our places to what we had at pre-flood
times.

Similarly, another respondent wrote: “I truly understand that
decision, of sacrifice [sic] some to save many, but in an instance
where this occurs, they should stand up and admit that they did this
and compensate the individuals who suffered due to that decision.”
FACTORS,
PERSONS, OR
ORGANIZATIONS

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

MEDIAN

25TH
PERCENTILE

75TH
PERCENTILE

Natural forces
Myself or
someone from
my household
Government of
the province of
Manitoba
Federal
Government of
Canada

7.66
0

11.38
0

0
0

0
0

10
0

73.62

27.80

80

50

100

2.62

8.08

0

0

0
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FACTORS,
PERSONS, OR
ORGANIZATIONS

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

MEDIAN

25TH
PERCENTILE

75TH
PERCENTILE

Bad luck
Government of
a community or
rural
municipality
Another
Canadian
province
The United
States

0.50
2.51

2.19
10.95

0
0

0
0

0
0

4.52

9.27

0

0

5

0.42

2.69

0

0

0

Other residents
0.03
0.37
in the area
Some
7.39
19
equipment
Other
1.86
9.86
No one/Nothing 0
0
Table 3 – Attribution of Cause

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

B. Respondents’ Perceptions of Justice
Procedural and distributive justice were investigated by asking
respondents to rate the fairness or unfairness of various statements on
a 5-point-Linkert scale. There were eight statements related to
procedural justice, three statements related to distributive justice, and
eight statements about respondents’ distributive preferences. Some
statements were worded positively—“I participated to the extent that I
desired in the process”—and others were reversed—“The people who
determined the compensation were biased”—to prevent response bias.
Similarly, the order of statements was randomized by the online
survey mechanism.
Table 4 shows the results of items related to perception of
procedural justice. Although respondents were overall a little more
dissatisfied than satisfied with the procedure, perceptions of
procedural justice were generally distributed along the spectrum.81 A
majority of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the delays, the
understandability of the outcome, and the standing that was given to
81. Respondents’ perceptions of procedural justice were normally distributed.
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them. On the other hand, a majority of respondents’ attitudes were
positive with respect to their degree of participation and their
interactions with the facility. Also, respondents’ perceptions were
almost evenly divided between positive and negative with regard to
trust in the decision-makers.
ITEMS ( = 0.801)82

Participation (N=171)
I participated to the extent that I
desired in the process.
Delay (N=176)
It took a reasonable amount of
time to resolve my claim.*
Trust in decision-makers
(N=156)
The people who determined the
compensation were trustworthy.
Standing (N=168)
The people who determined the
compensation considered my
views.
Outcome understandable
I can understand how the
amount of compensation was
determined.* (N=179)
Neutrality (N=156)
The people who determined the
compensation were unbiased.*
Relational concerns (N=181)
Representatives of the
compensation program treated
me with respect and dignity.

MEAN**

STANDARD
DEVIATION

PERCENTAGE OF
RESPONSES

DISAGREE***

NEUTRAL

AGREE***

3.3

1.2

27.5%
(47)

18.7%
(32)

53.8%
(92)

2.0

1.2

69.3%
(122)

16.5%
(29)

14.2%
(25)

2.8

1.0

32.7%
(51)

45.6%
(68)

25%
(39)

2.5

1.2

55.4%
(93)

15.5%
(26)

29.2%
(49)

2.2

1.1

68.2%
(122)

16.8%
(30)

15.1%
(27)

2.5

1.0

46.2%
(72)

39.7%
(62)

13.5%
(21)

3.4

1.1

23.2%
(42)

17.1%
(31)

59.7%
(108)

82. Cronbach’s alpha value is a measure of the internal consistency reliability of the
scale. Cronbach’s alpha values above 0.7 are considered acceptable, but those above 0.8 are
considered preferable. With a scale with fewer than ten items, it is common to find a low
Cronbach’s alpha value, and it may be more appropriate to report the mean inter-item
correlation. See Stephen R. Briggs & Jonathan M. Cheek, The Role of Factor Analysis in the
Development and Evaluation of Personality Scales, 54 J. PERSONALITY 106, 114-15 (1986).
For the procedural justice scale, the mean inter-item correlation is 0.346, with values ranging
from 0.147 to 0.713, which suggests a relationship among the items.
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MEAN**

STANDARD
DEVIATION
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PERCENTAGE OF
RESPONSES

DISAGREE***

NEUTRAL

1.2
48.9%
17.2%
Form understandable (N=180) 2.6
(88)
(31)
The forms that I need to fill out
were easy to understand.
Table 4 – Perceived Procedural Justice, by Item
* These statements were phrased in the negative form in the questionnaire.

AGREE***

33.9%
(61)

** Responses were coded as follows: “Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2),
“Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3), “Agree” (4), “Strongly Agree” (5).
*** “Agree” percentages combine “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” responses.
“Disagree” percentages combine “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree” responses.

The trend is clearer with perceptions of distributive justice
(Table 5).83 A majority of respondents thought that they received
unfair compensation, both in absolute terms and compared to what
others received. A majority of them also thought the criteria used by
the compensation programs to assess the value of the damaged
property were unfair.
ITEMS ( = 0.877)84

MEAN*

2.2
Absolute compensation
(N=176)
The amount of compensation
provided to me.
2.3
Relative compensation
(N=133)
The amount of compensation
provided to me as compared to
what others received.
2.0
Criteria (N=171)
The criteria used to assess the
value of damages incurred.
Table 5 – Perceived Distributive Justice

STANDARD
DEVIATION

PERCENTAGE OF
RESPONSES
UNFAIR**

NEUTRAL

FAIR**

1.3

68.2%
(120)

6.3%
(11)

25.6%
(45)

1.2

53.4%
(71)

32.3%
(43)

14.3%
(19)

1.2

71.3%
(122)

7.6%
(13)

21%
(36)

83. Respondents’ perceptions of distributive justice were normally distributed.
84. The mean inter-item correlation is 0.703, with values ranging from 0.633 to 0.794.
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* Responses were coded as follows: “Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2),
“Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3), “Agree” (4), “Strongly Agree” (5).
** “Fair” percentages combine “Very fair” and “Somewhat fair” responses.
“Unfair” percentages combine “Very unfair” and “Somewhat unfair” responses.

Distributive and procedural justice scores85 correlate together in
a statistically significant way (Spearman coefficient: 0.697, p-value
0.005). In other words, respondents who thought the procedure was
unfair were more likely to also think the outcome was unfair. This
result is consistent with the many studies indicating that perceptions
of procedure impact perceptions of outcome, and maybe to a lesser
extent, vice-versa.86
Respondents’ preferences for distributive principles were also
investigated. Respondents were given a list of suggested rules for
compensating victims of the 2011 floods and were asked to indicate
how fair they thought each rule was.87 Each statement was associated
with one distributive principle: equality, merit, need, or tort. As
Figure 2 illustrates, only for statements associated with tort
distribution did more respondents think it was fair or extremely fair
rather than neutral, unfair, or extremely unfair.

85. See infra Table 7 and accompanying text.
86. See Hegvedt & Cook, supra note 57, at 96; Tyler & Lind, supra note 45, at 70-71.
87. The statements were: “All victims receive the same amount of compensation
regardless of their damage” (equality); “Damage to luxurious or non-essential items is eligible
to compensation” (statement reversed, need 1); “Compensation’s goal is to guarantee that the
basic needs of claimants are met” (need 2); “Only those suffering flood damages who cannot,
on their own, afford the cost of renovation, restoration, and repair can receive compensation”
(need 3); “Lower or no compensation is provided to those who live in areas that are known to
be at risk of being flooded” (merit 1); “Lower or no compensation is provided to those who
had not taken appropriate measures to mitigate flood risks and flood damages” (merit 2);
“Compensation covers all types of damage, including psychological and emotional pain” (tort
1); “The amount of compensation equals the total cost of all damages” (tort 2). The responses
to each statement correlate with the responses to the other statement(s) within the same
category (equality, merit, need, tort). For example, the two tort statements correlate strongly
together (Spearman coefficient: 0.635, p 0.0005). However, the different categories are not
exclusive of one another, and they cannot be combined to form a scale. For example, high
preference for the tort principle does not significantly correlate with low preference for the
equality principle.
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Figure 2 – Respondents’ Distributive Preferences
* “Fair” percentages combine “Very fair” and “Somewhat fair” responses.
“Unfair” percentages combine “Very unfair” and “Somewhat unfair” responses.

Preference for tort distribution does not correlate with any of the
variables associated with perceptions of procedural and distributive
justice (Table 6). Only the level of education and desire for
accountability correlated with preference for distribution based on tort
principles.
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES

Severity of damage**
Amount of compensation
Attribution of cause to government of
Manitoba
Attribution of cause to natural forces
Attribution of cause to some equipment
Views regarding responsibility for disaster
assistance
Age
Annual income
Level of education

PREFERENCE FOR TORTS*
SPEARMAN
CORRELATION
0.018
0.061
-0.025

P-VALUE

0.086
0.102
-0.071

0.285
0.206
0.387

-0.097
0.036
0.184

0.238
0.678
0.025

0.835
0.454
0.758
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CONTINUOUS VARIABLES

PREFERENCE FOR TORTS*
SPEARMAN
CORRELATION
0.032
-0.079

P-VALUE

ODDS RATIO
(95%CI)

P-VALUE

0.67 (0.33-1.35)

0.258

NA****

NA****

0.87 (0.40-1.87)
0.81 (0.38-1.75)
1.57 (0.65-3.77)

0.714
0.590
0.314

1.02 (0.40-2.59)

0.971

Be heard

0.82 (0.42-1.60)

0.558

Retribution

0.76 (0.39-1.50)

0.433

Acknowledgment

1.22 (0.63-2.38)

0.558

Accountability

0.35 (0.13-0.90)

0.025

Prevention

2.08 (0.99-4.36)

0.051

Household size
Level of activism***
DICHOTOMOUS FACTORS
Compensation
program with which
application was filed
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DFA
Lake Manitoba FAP

Persistence of damage
Respondents expecting more compensation
Expectations at the
Receive money
time of filing the
Buy-out
application

0.694
0.334

Attribution of fault *****
0.509 (0.16-1.65)
0.253
Male Gender
1.026 (0.52-2.12)
0.940
Employment status
1.18 (0.53-2.61)
0.68
Working (full-time or
part-time)
Retired
1.05 (0.47-2.33)
0.90
Table 6 – Bivariate Analysis for Preference for Torts
* The preference for torts refers to the score for torts. Respondents’ ratings of
tort statements were coded as follows: “very unfair” (1), “unfair” (2), “neither
fair nor unfair” (3), “fair” (4), and “very fair” (5). The score for torts was
obtained by combining respondents’ coded answer on the two statements related
to torts. The score was transformed into a dichotomic variable: Scores of 6 and
below were coded as “no preference for tort principle,” and scores of 7 and
above were coded “yes, preference for tort principle.”
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** Severity of damage refers to the score of damage severity. Respondents’
ratings of each of the 8 categories of damage were coded “None” (1), “Low” (2),
“Average” (3), and “High” (4). Each respondent’s coded answers were added
together to obtain a score of damage severity, ranging from 8 to 32.
*** Level of activism: Responses were coded not active (0), participant (1),
organizer (2), speaker (3), and activist (4). See Appendix for details of coding.
**** All considered respondents indicated that they filed an application with the
Lake Manitoba FAP, therefore no odds ratio or chi-square was calculated.
***** Attribution of fault refers to whether respondents indicated they thought
their loss was theirs or someone else’s fault. “Yes” combines responses
“Somewhat” and “Completely.” “No” incorporates the response “Not at all.”

C. Factors Influencing Justice Judgments
These results lead us to the main inquiry of this Paper: What
factors influenced respondents’ justice judgments? First, among all
the variables measured in the survey, I identified several that
correlated with perceptions of procedural and distributive justice in
bivariate analyses. As Table 7 shows, six variables correlated with
perception of procedural justice, perception of distributive justice, or
both. These variables were:
Damage suffered (severity of damage and persistence of
damage),
Compensation received (amount of award and future expected
compensation),
Attribution of cause,
Views regarding responsibility for disaster assistance,
Filing an application with the DFA,88 and
Having some type of expectation.

88. Due to the extreme complexity of the different compensation programs, there is a
risk that respondents’ reports of the program(s) with which they filed an application were not
always accurate.
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CONTINUOUS VARIABLES

PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE*
SPEARMAN

P-VALUE

CORRELATION

Severity of damage***
Amount of compensation
Attribution of cause to
government of Manitoba
Attribution of cause to natural
forces
Attribution of cause to some
equipment
Views regarding responsibility for
disaster assistance
Age
Annual income
Level of education
Household size
Level of activism***
DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES

Compensation
program with
which
application
was filed

DFA
Lake Manitoba
FAP

Persistence of damage
Respondents expecting more
compensation

279
DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE**
SPEARMAN

P-VALUE

CORRELATION

-0.545
-0.211
-0.282

<0.0005
0.02
0.001

-0.471
-0.161
-0.214

<0.0005
0.07
0.02

0.403

0.0005

0.397

0.0005

-0.052

0.56

-0.067

0.46

0.14

0.12

0.27

0.003

-0.01
0.158
0.04
0.044
-0.026

0.91
0.10
0.65
0.63
0.77

0.109
0.114
-0.024
0.087
-0.029

0.83
0.24
0.80
0.34
0.75

ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

PVALUE

ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

VALUE

0.33
(0.120.94)
1.06
(0.205.49)
0.13 (0.050.32)
4.16
(1.6210.69)

0.03
0.95
0.0005
0.002

0.60
(0.221.63)
NA****
0.30
(0.120.76)
2.64
(1.016.92)

P-

0.31
0.12
0.009
0.04
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Expectations
at the time of
filing the
application

Receive money

ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

PVALUE
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ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

PVALUE

0.90
0.85
0.59
0.36
(0.30(0.192.74)
1.85)
Buy-out
0.27
0.08
0.80
0.02
(0.60(0.731.25)
0.88)
Be heard
0.23
0.12
0.003
0.002
(0.08(0.030.63)
0.55)
Retribution
0.43
0.34
0.04
0.02
(0.19(0.140.95)
0.84)
Acknowledgment
0.36
0.14
0.01
<0.0005
(0.16(0.050.81)
0.38)
Accountability
0.30
0.20
0.008
0.001
(0.12(0.080.76)
0.53)
Prevention
1.25
0.63
0.98
0.97
(0.51(0.373.11)
2.62)
Attribution of fault***
2.34
0.273
1.77
0.47
(0.49(0.3711.07)
8.41)
Male Gender
1.21
0.65
0.87
0.77
(0.54(0.352.69)
2.18)
Employment
1.18
0.68
1.27
0.59
status
Working (full(0.53(0.53time or part-time)
2.61)
3.07)
Retired
1.05
0.90
0.65
0.36
(0.47(0.262.33)
1.65)
Table 7 – Bivariate Analysis for Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive
Justice
* Perceived procedural justice refers to the score of procedural justice.
Respondents’ answers to each procedural justice item were coded as follows:
“Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2), “Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3),
“Agree” (4), and “Strongly Agree” (5). Each respondent’s coded answers were
added together to obtain a score of procedural justice. Scores from 8 to 24 were
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coded as not satisfied, and those higher than 24 were coded as satisfied. Scores
below 8—that is, for respondents who did not respond to each item of
procedural justice—were excluded.
** Perceived distributive justice refers to the score of distributive justice.
Respondents’ answers to each distributive justice item were coded as follows:
“Strongly Disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2), “Neither Agree nor Disagree” (3),
“Agree” (4), and “Strongly Agree” (5). Each respondent’s coded answers were
added together to obtain a score of distributive justice. Scores from 3 to 9 were
coded as not satisfied, and those higher than 9 were coded as satisfied. Scores
below 3—that is, for respondents who did not respond to each item of
distributive justice—were excluded.
*** See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.
**** All considered respondents indicated that they filed an application with the
Lake Manitoba FAP.

All variables associated with procedural justice or distributive
justice in bivariate analyses were then analyzed through multiple
regression.89
Results show that only severity of damage, persistence of
damage, and attribution of cause to natural forces were independently
associated with perceived procedural justice in a statistically
significant way (Table 8).90 In other words, the association that was
first found with the other factors was secondary to the association
with these three variables. The r-square of this model was 0.478,
89. See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE
STATISTICS 113 (5th ed. 2007). Multiple regression requires a large sample, no outliers, no
multicollinearity, and normality. As to the size of the sample, Tabachnick and Fidell
recommend N > 50 + 8m where “m” is the number of independent variables. Since thirteen
independent variables are used here, the minimum would be 154 cases. The size of my
respondent population is therefore sufficient. Tabachnick and Fidell define outliers as cases
that have a standardized residual (as displayed in the scatterplot) of more than 3.0 or less than 3.0. None of these were identified for procedural justice and one was identified for distributive
justice with a residual value of 3.565. This case did not have an undue influence on the results
for the model as a whole, as the maximum value for Cook’s distance was 0.075. According to
Tabachnick and Fidell, cases with a maximum Cook’s value above 1 can be a problem. See id.
Normality was confirmed in a normal probability plot. As to multicollinearity, Julie Pallant
recommends not to include independent variables with a bivariate correlation of 0.7 or more in
the same analysis. See JULIE PALLANT, SPSS SURVIVAL MANUAL 158 (4th ed. 2010). None of
the 13 variables assessed were that highly correlated.
90. There was no correlation with attribution of blame to government of Manitoba. The
very high number of respondents who attributed fault to the government may in part explain
this. Only 13% (14) of the respondents thought their losses were nobody’s fault, and among
respondents who blamed someone, 95% blamed the government of Manitoba.
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meaning that this model explains 47.8% of the respondents’ perceived
procedural justice. Severity of damage explains 9% of perceived
procedural justice, persistence of damage 2.89%, and attribution to
natural forces 4%.91
Similar multivariate analysis for perceived distributive justice
shows that only severity of damage, attribution of cause to natural
forces, and expectations of buy-out statistically significantly
correlated with perception of distributive justice. The model explains
51.1% of perceived distributive justice (r-square = 0.511). Severity of
damage explains 6.76%, attribution to natural forces 8.41%, and
expectations of buy-out 2.89% of perceptions of distributive fairness.
I inquired a little further on the severity of damage factor.
Breaking down the eight categories of damage into material and nonmaterial damages, severity of damage for both types correlated
together (Spearman coefficient: 0.529, p<0.0005). Therefore, the
more severely respondents evaluated their material damages, the more
likely they were to evaluate their non-material damages as severe.
However, in linear regression, only severity of material damage is
statistically significantly associated with the perceived procedural and
distributive justice.92 It is, then, respondents’ evaluation of their
material damage that influences whether they think the compensation
program is just or not.
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE*
VARIABLES

STANDARD-

P-VALUE

IZED

CORRELA-

P-VALUE

TION PART

CORRELATION
PART

COEFFICIENT
(BETA)

Severity of damage**

-0.376

Persistence of damage
Amount of
compensation
Respondents expecting
more compensation

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE*
STANDARDIZED
COEFFICIENT
(BETA)

-0.3

-.325

0.001

-0.26

-0.20
0.045

0.000
5
0.032
0.596

0.17
0.04

-0.10
0.10

0.25
0.23

0.09
0.09

0.098

0.241

0.09

0.07

0.367

0.07

91. These percentages correspond to the squared correlation part for each variable. The
sum of these parts does not equal the r-square value of the model because they represent only
the unique contribution of each variable to the model, with any overlap or shared variance
removed.
92. For perceived procedural justice: (a) Severity of material damages: standardized
coefficient (beta): -0.559, p<0.0005. (b) Severity of non-material damages: standardized
coefficient (beta): -0.005, p=0.96.
For perceived distributive justice: (a) Severity of material damages: standardized
coefficient (beta): -0.433, p<0.0005. (b) Severity of non-material damages: standardized
coefficient (beta): -0.098, p=0.328.
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PROCEDURAL JUSTICE*

VARIABLES
Filing an application
with the DFA
Attribution of cause to
government of
Manitoba
Attribution of cause to
natural forces
Views regarding
responsibility for
disaster assistance
ExpectBe heard
ations
Retributio
n
Acknowledgment
Accountability
Buy out

STANDARD-

P-VALUE

IZED
COEFFICIENT
(BETA)

CORRELATION PART
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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE*
STANDARDIZED
COEFFICIENT
(BETA)

P-VALUE

CORRELATION
PART

NA

NA

NA

-0.08

0.355

-0.07

-0.019

0.825

-0.016

0.240

0.01

0.20

0.34

0.29

Not associated in bivariate
analysis

0.06

0.000
5
0.49

-0.05

-0.93
-0.10

0.30
0.288

-0.08
-0.08

-0.06
0.05

0.48
0.60

-0.05
0.04

0.02

0.86

0.14

-0.13

0.16

-0.11

-0.10

0.32

-0.77

-0.10

0.30

-0.08

Not associated in bivariate
analysis

-0.18

0.03

-0.17

Not associated in bivariate analysis

Table 8 – Multivariate Analysis for Perceived Procedural and Distributive
Justice
* See supra Table 7 and accompanying text.
** See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.

D. Validation of Results
The number of respondents in Delta Beach was too small to
analyze the results through multiple regressions.93 I therefore
investigated associations between variables and perceptions of justice
using only bivariate analyses.
Interestingly, three of the four variables that were independently
associated with perceptions of justice in the first two communities
were also associated with perceptions of justice in the community of
validation. As mentioned before, multivariate analysis indicated the
following variables were statistically correlated with perceptions of
justice in TLB and LB&SP: 1) severity of damage; 2) persistence of
damage—for procedural justice only; 3) attribution of cause to natural
93. As mentioned before, multiple regression requires a large sample. Tabachnick and
Fidell recommend N > 50 + 8m where “m” is the amount of independent variables. Since 13
independent variables are used here, the minimum would be 154 cases. In the community of
validation, N = 38 and is therefore too small. See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 89, at
113.
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forces; and 4) expectations of buy-out—for distributive justice only.
The association with the first three variables was confirmed in the
community of validation.
Indeed, in Delta Beach, bivariate analysis revealed a statistically
significant association between perceptions of justice and 1) severity
of damage; 2) persistence of damage—for perceived procedural
justice only; and 3) attribution of cause to natural forces—for
distributive justice only (Table 9).94
The fact that with only thirty-eight respondents I was able to
confirm the associations between perceptions of justice and three
variables—severity of damage, persistence of damage, and attribution
of cause to natural forces—shows that these associations are robust.
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES

PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE*
SPEARMAN
CORRELA-

P-VALUE

TION

Severity of damage**
Amount of compensation
Attribution of cause to
government of Manitoba
Attribution of cause to natural
forces
Views regarding responsibility for
disaster assistance
DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES

Compensation
program with
which
application
was filed

DFA

DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE*
SPEARMAN
CORRELA-

P-VALUE

TION

-0.641
-0.143
-0.088

<0.0005
0.40
0.061

-0.723
-0.126
-0.008

<0.0005
0.49
0.97

0.293

0.08

0.502

0.003

0.228

0.19

0.062

0.74

ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

PVALUE

ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

VALUE

0.623
(0.1322.95)

0.55

0.37
(0.062.19)

P-

0.26

94. Although attribution of cause to natural forces was not significantly associated with
procedural justice judgments due to the small number of respondents, results indicate a trend
that the more respondents were attributing cause to natural causes, the more they were satisfied
with procedural justice. Also, it has not been possible to confirm the association between
distributive justice judgments and expectations of buy-out as only two respondents in Delta
Beach indicated they hoped the government would buy their property.
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Persistence of damage

0.04
(0.0040.36)

DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES

ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

Respondents expecting more
compensation
Expectations
at the time of
filing the
application

Receive money
Buy-out
Be heard
Retribution
Acknowledgment
Accountability

2.66
(0.4715.25)
0.72
(0.068.9)
0.93
(0.831.03)
0.74
(0.590.93)
0.19
(0.040.90)
0.11
(0.020.61)
0.19
(0.040.90)

285

0.005

0.32
(0.061.64)

P-

ODDS
RATIO
(95%CI)

VALUE

0.26
0.80
0.38
0.07
0.03
0.006
0.03

0.16

PVALUE

4.92
(0.5247.07)
0.36
(0.026.53)
N/A

0.14

0.35
(0.043.46)
0.17
(0.030.92)
0.27
(0.051.36)
0.4
(0.092.21)

0.36

0.48
0.53

0.003
0.10
0.31

Prevention

0.28
0.09
0.282
0.12
(0.06(0.061.27)
1.41)
Table 9 – Bivariate Analysis for Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive
Justice (Delta Beach)
* See supra Table 7 and accompanying text.
** See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.

V. DISCUSSION
The overriding finding of this Study is that damage—severity
and persistence—and attribution of cause influence victims’
perceptions of the fairness of the government disaster compensation
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programs, while other variables such as the amount of compensation
do not.95 I will take these two factors in turn to discuss the main
implications of these findings.
A. Damage and Perceptions of Justice
Victims’ perception of their damage impacts how fair they
evaluated the process and the outcome of the government
compensation programs to be.96 The more severe respondents
perceived their material damage to be—damage to property, cleanup
costs, temporary mitigation measures, etc.—the more likely they were
to judge procedural and distributive justice as low. In the same vein,
respondents who were still suffering from damage at the time of the
survey were more critical of the government compensation programs
process.
Of course, there is no objective measure of harm with which to
compare respondents’ subjective evaluation of their damage. Still, I
suspect that what is important for justice judgments is not harm as
measured objectively, but rather harm as a subjective and social
experience. Even though the respondents all went through the same
disaster, they experienced it differently, and they remember it
differently. It is how salient the harm was to each of them that seems
to influence how they engaged in the compensation process and how
they evaluated it afterwards.97 An interpretation of the respondents’

95. I also found that expectation of buy-out was a determinant of distributive justice
judgments, but this finding is very specific to the case studied. Since the compensation
programs in the areas included in the study did not offer any buy-out, it seems that those who
wanted the government to buy their property were more dissatisfied with the outcome of the
compensation process simply because they did not obtain what they wanted.
96. Bornstein and Poser’s finding on the 9/11 VCF might also suggest that perceived
damage is a controlling factor for satisfaction with disaster programs created to compensate
mostly immaterial loss. Indeed, they found that the claimant’s relationship to the decedent
(spouse/partner vs. parent vs. other) influenced their perception of both procedural and
distributive justice. In many cases, it is reasonable to think that the claimant’s relationship to
the decedent also influenced how salient the damage, or suffering, was to them. See Bornstein
& Poser, supra note 9, at 93-94.
97. Objective information about the procedure each respondent experienced—the delay,
identity of programs agents involved in their case, type and frequency of contacts with
programs agents, length of decision, etc.—could not be collected as part of this Study.
Therefore, it was not possible to evaluate how much these variables are correlated with
severity of damage and to what extent they explain justice judgments. Although I think the
results show that justice has a different meaning for the victims interpreting their experience as
more harmful, it remains a possibility that these victims did have an experience of the
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personal harm as severe, and as more severe than others’ personal
harm, appears to have created higher expectations of what the
compensation programs should deliver in terms of procedure and
outcome.
These higher expectations were twofold: they wanted to have
someone hear what happened to them, and they wanted to obtain a
decision acknowledging the damage they suffered. Indeed, results
show that those evaluating their damage as more severe were more
likely than others to expect voicing and acknowledgment from the
government compensation program(s) (Table 10).
VARIABLES
Expectations at the
time of filing the
application

ODDS RATIO
(95%CI)

P-VALUE

Receive money

1.21 (0.51-2.87)

0.67

Buy-out

2.20 (0.76-6.40)

0.14

Be heard

2.38 (1.15-4.89)

0.02

Retribution

1.11 (0.58-2.14)

0.76

Acknowledgment

2.04 (1.05-3.94)

0.03

Accountability

1.21 (0.55-2.65)

0.64

Prevention

0.99 (0.49-2.01)

0.98

Table 10 – Correlation Between Damage and Expectations
Score of damage severity (see supra Table 6 and accompanying text) was
transformed into a dichotomous variable. All scores between 10 and 19 points
were coded (1), and all scores between 20 and 32 were coded (2).

These results confirm that it is insufficient to define disaster
victims’ expectations in terms of monetary interests. Respondents
with more salient harms were dissatisfied with the procedure and
outcome of the compensation programs not because they wanted
more money. They were dissatisfied because the opportunities they
had to voice their complaints and receive acknowledgement were
insufficient for them. These findings support previous research
compensation process that was objectively different from those with less severe harms that
could explain their differing justice judgments.
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showing that claimants to disaster relief programs hope for more than
money.98 Adding to that, my results suggest that voicing and
acknowledgment are of particular importance to those who consider
themselves severely affected victims.
Is money irrelevant then? Some of these results open interesting
areas of reflection on the role of money in compensating disaster
victims. First, the amount of compensation received, as reported by
victims, was negatively correlated with high justice judgments
(Table 7). In other words, those getting more money were more
dissatisfied with the process and the outcome of the compensation
programs. How can this be explained? When controlling for the
damage—severity and persistence, there was no longer a statistically
significant association between the amount of compensation and
justice judgments. This is important because it means that the
association between the amount received and justice judgments was
secondary to the association between damage and justice judgments.
In other words, those who reported receiving higher amounts of
compensation were more critical of government compensation
programs because they suffered more severe damage. Otherwise, the
amount of awards did not predict justice judgments in a statistically
significant way.99
98. Similarly, in her research on the 9/11 VCF, Hadfield found that 9/11 victims framed
their choice between a VCF award and litigation as also being guided by non-monetary values
such as obtaining information, accountability, and policy change. Hadfield, supra note 9, at
660-73; see also Tyler, supra note 52, at 203 (reporting the results of a study showing that if
US asbestos victims were offered equal settlements through a quick arbitration or through a
longer, drawn-out trial, many victims would choose the latter); KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL.,
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION
FUND OF 2001, at 111 (2004) (indicating that over 68% of claimants who filed a claim to the
VCF for the death of a victim opted for the hearing process).
99. This finding seems to contradict Bornstein and Poser’s conclusion that the more
money claimants to the 9/11 VCF received, the more satisfied they were with distributive
aspects of the fund. They also concluded that the amount of compensation was positively
correlated with the satisfaction of procedure. However, the p-value for this association (p<
0.08) was higher than the minimum p-value (0.05) for statistically significant results. See
Bornstein & Poser, supra note 9, at 93-94. In the case of the 9/11 VCF, however,
compensation was heavily guided by tort principles. The statute required that the Special
Master set compensation according to “the extent of harm to the claimant, including any
economic and non-economic losses.” See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2001). Although the Special Master Kenneth Feinberg modified the
distributive principles and abandoned some tort-inspired rules, this compensation fund remains
one of the most, if not the most, generous in history. The average award was US$2.08 million
and the median was US$1.7 million. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 202 (2005). The
unprecedented generosity of the fund may explain why claimants receiving higher
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Second, there likely is a link between the finding that harms
influence perceptions of justice and the finding that a majority of
respondents preferred a distribution based on tort principles.100 It is
important to note that the preference for tort principles I observed was
not influenced in a statistically significant way by any variables—
except for the level of education and expectations of accountability.101
The preference for tort principles was observed among victims
reporting various levels of harms, amounts of compensation,
satisfaction with procedural or distributive justice, and attributions of
cause. A majority of those who suffered damage as a result of the
floods—however salient this damage is to them—thought distribution
based on equity—merit, equality, or need would be unfair. They
wanted relief allocation based on tort principles.
This preference for tort principles likely reflects the importance
of damages in forming justice judgments. The very basis of tort
distribution is the damage suffered by the claimants. The tort system
aims at making faultless plaintiffs “whole” by compensating the full
measure of their losses. Compared to equity, equality, or need, tort
principles are obviously the most generous distributive principles for
the victims. However, as mentioned before, when controlling for the
damage, the amount of money received is not significantly associated
with perception of procedural and distributive fairness. Therefore, it
does not seem that respondents preferred tort distribution because of a
self-interested desire to maximize personal gain.
It is likely that tort distribution is the fairest in respondents’ view
because it is guided by a measurement of their damages. In short,
their justice judgments seem to have been influenced by the salience
of their damage, and they therefore demanded a compensation
distribution based on damage levels—that is, the tort principle.
Because of various caps placed on material compensation, victims
compensation—despite presumably having suffered more severe damage—were more satisfied
with the distribution. As many have stated, however, it is doubtful that such a generous fund
will be created again in the future. Therefore, it is important to understand victims’ perception
of justice towards more modest compensation programs, such as those set up to compensate
victims of natural disasters.
100. The preference for tort distribution found in this research study is consistent with
Hensler’s study on 9/11 victims’ survivors’ views of compensation. She also found that
victims’ survivors—potential claimants to the VCF—preferred tort compensation before they
even submitted their claim to the compensation fund. Hensler, supra note 9, at 439.
101. Level of education: Spearman correlation = 0.184, p-value = 0.025. Expectations of
accountability: Odds ratio (95%CI) = 0.35 (0.13-0.90), p-value = 0.025. The preference for tort
distribution refers to the score for torts. See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.
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with higher reported damage were awarded a compensation that was
more difficult to fit in a tort compensation model. Hence, they tended
to be less satisfied with the outcome and the process of their
compensation applications.
B. Attribution and Perceptions of Justice
Justice also appears to have a different meaning for those
attributing cause to impersonal forces, as compared to those who
thought the disaster was man-made. The more respondents thought
their damage was a result of natural forces, the more likely they were
to evaluate the process and outcome as fair.102
The association between attribution of cause and perceived
fairness of the outcome could be explained in two ways. First, it may
be that the closer to the “man-made” end of the disaster spectrum
people placed the floods, the fuller they expected to be compensated.
This resonates with the comment of one respondent that “if the
government intentionally causes the flood, the victims must be 100%
compensated. If the flood is an act of nature, the government should
be responsible for assistance, but not 100% compensation.” However,
it must be remembered that preference for torts—that is, preference
for full compensation—did not vary depending on respondents’ views
of who caused their damage. So this explanation may not fully grasp
the relationship between attribution to nature and perceived fairness
of the outcome.
Another possibility, more plausible in my view, is that what
links attribution of cause and perceived fairness of the outcome is a
retributive justice judgment. As mentioned in the theoretical
frameworks, satisfaction with the outcome can be both a distributive
justice and a retributive justice judgment. Because, by definition,
retributive judgments demand that someone be seen as violating a
rule, respondents who thought natural forces played a more important
role in the disaster had fewer retributive desires. Results indeed show
that the more respondents attributed cause to natural forces, the less
likely they were to report retributive expectations.103 Therefore, what
102. I suspect that in a study of a disaster where views of attribution of responsibility are
more diversified than was the case here, there would also be a correlation between the level of
blame (attribution of fault) and justice judgments about the outcome.
103. There is a statistically significant negative correlation between attribution of cause
to nature and expectation of retribution. Odds ratio (95%CI) = 0.52 (0.28-0.97), p-value =
0.039. Attribution of cause to nature was transformed into a dichotomous variable. All
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these respondents thought was a satisfying award meeting their
retributive urge was smaller compared to victims who saw the floods
as the product of human conduct. Conversely, victims who thought
the disaster was man-made were more likely to want those who
caused their loss to pay for what they did. This possibly transposed
into expectations of bigger awards, and, as a result, more
dissatisfaction with the outcome.
The next puzzle is why those attributing cause to nature were
also more satisfied with the procedure. Part of it may be that
judgments about the outcome influenced judgments about the
procedure. Still, there is probably more to it than that. Those who saw
the floods more as an act of God felt less need to obtain an
acknowledgement of accountability from someone. Or, inversely,
those who thought the floods were the result of man’s actions wanted
those who caused their losses to be held accountable. Indeed,
attribution of cause to natural forces, in addition to negatively
correlating with expectations of retribution, also negatively correlated
with expectations of accountability.104
On this need for accountability, one respondent wrote:
This lack of acknowledgement on the government’s part, and
their phrasing of compensation as ‘financial assistance’ can give
the impression that the government is being noble or
unnecessarily kind, when in fact, they appear to be trying to get
maximum credit, and minimal blame for the lowest price
possible, and I find this to be a disgrace.

For those who thought the disaster was man-made, the lack of
acknowledgement by those who were seen as responsible—mainly
the Manitoban government—anchored these victims in a position of
distrust. This likely impacted how fair they estimated the
compensation process—a process run by the same institution they
thought was the cause for their losses—to be.

responses attributing between 0 and 9 points to Natural forces were coded (1), and the rest
were coded (2).
104. There is a statistically significant and negative correlation between attribution of
cause to nature and expectation of accountability. Odds ratio (95%CI) = 0.45 (0.21-0.96), pvalue = 0.04.
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CONCLUSION
What is fair compensation for victims of disaster? This Study
shows that, for a majority of victims, fairness does not equate with
maximization of personal awards. Rather, it first means receiving a
compensation that aligns, both in process and outcome, with the
damage suffered, as it is perceived and remembered. Victims
reporting severe and persistent damage expect more opportunities to
voice their suffering and receive acknowledgment in return. Also a
majority of victims preferred distribution of compensation awards
based on tort principles, precisely because they are guided by a
measurement of their damage.
Fairness, in the view of a majority of victims, also means a
process and an outcome that take into account whether nature or man
caused their losses. Victims perceiving the disaster as man-made
rather than natural expect an award commensurate with their need for
retribution and a process leaving space for accountability.
The most direct implication of this study is to help policy makers
shape compensation programs in a way that improves their legitimacy
and beneficiaries’ acceptance of them. In this regard, the results offer
support to those calling for process pluralism,105 where compensation
programs offer various claim evaluation options, each of them
striking a different balance between administrative simplicity and cost
efficiency on the one hand, and individualized analysis and full
compensation on the other hand.106 Indeed, as disaster victims’
expectations vary depending on how they perceive their damage and
what they think cause their losses, I suspect that rare will be the cases
where one compensation recipe will satisfy them all. More often, as
105. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 105 (1990); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Funds and the
Election of Remedies: The Need for Informed Consent, 31 REV. LITIG. 833 (2012) (discussing
the need for an intelligent, knowing, and informed consent prior to a claimant’s electing relief
from the compensation program).
106. See generally Diller, supra note 64, at 726-33 (comparing social welfare and tort
regimes); Greenspan & Neuburger, supra note 43, at 116 (comparing the possibility of
obtaining information through litigation and administrative programs); Deborah R. Hensler, A
Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass
Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1616 (1995) (explaining that claims
facilities can be merely administrative payment schemes or “individualized dispute resolution
procedures”); Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims
Resolution Facilities, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (1990) (generally comparing models
of claims processing facilities based on their similarities to litigation); Schneider, supra note
52, at 475 (comparing the transformative aspects of litigation and administrative funds).
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Kenneth Feinberg wrote, it will be that “different claims resolution
techniques [will be] appropriate for different claimants.”107
Victims who do not perceive their damage as severe and/or who
think the disaster was mainly the result of natural forces might prefer
a simplified and expedited process, using predetermined formulas or
schedules to fix an amount of compensation that will usually be
lower. On the other hand, claimants who perceive themselves as
severely harmed by a man-made disaster might rather opt for a more
comprehensive process that, despite longer delays and a heightened
proof requirement, offers extended opportunities for claimants to be
heard and results in an award that is individually determined, and
hence might reflect more closely the amount of damage they
sustained. The aim of giving claimants different options of procedure
and outcome is to meet the varying expectations of disaster victims
better.
These results also provide information that might help policy
makers decide whether to retain the tort system above the limits of the
government compensation programs.108 The vast majority of
claimants preferred a distribution of relief money based on tort
principles. However, creating a compensation program based on these
very generous principles will often not be possible. In this context,
retaining the tort system as a residual mechanism of compensation—
for example, for the small number of cases that involve very serious
damages in what can be proved to be a man-made disaster—might be
an option to enhance claimants’ feelings of fairness.
My results teach us about fair disaster compensation, as defined
by flood victims, in a context where the government was both the
potential source of the losses and the compensation provider. The
present results could lead to further research on perceptions of
fairness of disaster victims in various contexts: a terrorist act resulting
in mostly immaterial damages, an earthquake with abstract causes, an
oil spill where a company runs the compensation program, etc.
Because just like fairness, disaster is a multi-faceted concept that
often changes through the eye of the beholder.

107. Feinberg, supra note 105, at 105 (adding that “the claimant is in the best position to
determine the optimum procedure for resolving the claim”).
108. See generally Rabin, supra note 6, at 974-76 (discussing issues related to whether to
retain the tort system in administrative compensation scheme).
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APPENDIX – RESPONDENTS’ CHARACTERISTICS
A. Demographic Characteristics
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

RESPONDENTS

Gender
Mean age
Median age
Type of property

59% (108) male
58.06
58.5
Cottage: 79% (151)
House: 19% (36)
Lease: 1% (1)
Business (non farm): 2% (3)

Number of persons in household –
Average
Occupation

2.67
Working full time: 43% (81)
Working part time: 7% (13)
Retired: 43% (82)
Looking after home/family: 2% (4)

Employment rate*

50% (88)

Annual income for household
(2012)

None: 1% (1)
Less than $20,000: 3% (4)
$20,000 to $39,999: 18% (28)
$40,000 to $59,999: 19% (30)
$60,000 to $79,999: 16% (25)
$80,000 to $99,999: 10% (16)
$100,000 to 119,999: 9% (15)
$120,000 to $139,999: 9% (14)
$140,000 or more: 16% (26)

Highest level of education

Grade 8 or less: 1% (2)
Some high school: 4% (8)
High school degree: 21% (38)
Technical / vocational post-secondary
college: 22% (40)
Some university: 13% (23)
University degree: 28% (51)
Post graduate degree: 10% (18)

Table 11 – Respondent Characteristics (Twin Lake Beach and Lundar
Beach & Sugar Point)
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* Employment rate was obtained by adding working full-time and working parttime responses.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

RESPONDENTS

Gender
Mean age
Median age
Type of property

75% (27) male
61.3
61.5
Cottage: 76% (29)
House: 18% (7)
Business (non farm): 6% (2)

Number of persons in household –
Average
Occupation

2.39
Working full time: 38% (14)
Working part time: 19% (7)
Retired: 43% (16)

Employment rate*

57% (21)

Annual income for household
(2012)

None: 0% (0)
Less than $20,000: 0% (0)
$20,000 to $39,999: 6% (2)
$40,000 to $59,999: 26% (8)
$60,000 to $79,999: 26% (8)
$80,000 to $99,999: 16% (5)
$100,000 to 119,999: 13% (4)
$120,000 to $139,999: 6% (2)
$140,000 or more: 6% (2)

Highest level of education

Grade 8 or less: 0% (0)
Some high school: 3% (1)
High school degree: 9% (3)
Technical / vocational post-secondary
college: 23% (8)
Some university: 11% (4)
University degree: 26% (9)
Post graduate degree: 29% (10)

Table 12 – Respondent Characteristics (Delta Beach)
* See supra Table 11 and accompanying text.
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B. Respondents’ Level of Activism
Respondents were asked to indicate if they had been involved in
any of the following activities, with regard to compensation after the
2011 spring floods:
I have not been an active participant in public discussions or
debates (0);
I have spoken in public and/or in the media about my concerns
(3);
I have been involved in lobbying government representatives (4);
I was active in efforts to change the compensation program (4);
I have organized meetings for victims of flood damage (2);
I have participated in meetings or discussions among victims of
flood damage (including electronic discussions, such as on a
listserv, blog, or Facebook page) (1);
I have established or participated in organizations to change the
way things are done (4);
I have written articles or letters for publication (3); and
None (0)

Responses were coded not active (0), participant (1), organizer
(2), speaker (3), and activist (4). As multiple answers were allowed,
respondents were then coded based on the highest score among their
responses.109
As Table 13 indicates, there was a great variation in
respondents’ levels of activism. More than half of respondents had
either not been active or had a very low level of activism with regard
to the 2011 spring floods. The rate of respondents indicating they
engaged in speaker and activist activities (46.5%) may have partly
been the result of self-selection. In any event, no statistically
significant differences were detected in the responses of activists and
non-activists.
LEVEL OF ACTIVISM
Not Active
Participant

RESPONDENTS
18.0% (31)
35.5% (61)

109. The structure of this question was taken from the survey of Hadfield. Hadfield,
supra note 9, at 678-79.
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RESPONDENTS

Organizer
0% (0)
Speaker
10.5% (18)
Activist
36.0% (62)
Table 13 – Level of Activism (Twin Lake Beach and Lundar Beach & Sugar
Point) N=172

